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SIDIELE:	Recipical Training	DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77	
		Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763	25X1
1.	Recont conversation	Date: 8 MAR 1978 By: s with OFSO and SES hav	25X1
		present programs and future plans for Technical	
draining.	it is divising tim	t case of our training duplicates what is being	, •
does by t	CD and CD, equally	obvious that much closer integration of Techni	.cal
raining	by whosever done,	with Intelligence Training is necessary.	
a .	over the past year	and a half, most of our efforts in TRS have bee	m
dovoted t	o the development o	s a logical and effective program of intelligen	100
training,	, both Staff and Cov	ert. Though we intend to improve further this	
To equip	training, we feel t	that we now have the kind of program of which we	}

- and One—can be dairly proud. Our efforts during this coming year—subject to the world situation—will be shifted to working out better training in administration, in language and area studies, and, particularly, in the application of technical aids to operations—defensively and offensively. We therefore welcome the current concern over the status of Technical Training.

 3. Discussion of Technical Training is senetimes difficult because no solid definition of what we mean by "Technical" has yet been agreed upon, however, I think I can describe our approach to "technical" matters in train-
- In order to describe more accurately our approach to the technical aspects of our business, we in TRS have decided to call the training previously titled "Technical" "Counter-intelligence Training." Perhaps a title such as "Police Nethods" or "Investigative Nethods" would be as accurate. In any case

ing and, thereby, perhaps arrive at a working understanding of what it is and

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what it is not.

our approach has been and will be based on the premise that all OSC staff and covert personnel going overseas must live and operate on the assumption that all the techniques of modern investigative science will be thrown against them. Also, we must train some of our people either to use or to instruct others in these techniques. Within this group there are also to who need thereough familiarity with counter-datellinence techniques—namely, our of our woo will have close working relationships with the Security Agencies of other powers and, therefore, must be able to speak the investigative language and coment the limited by operational advice and supply.

5. If the above principles are sound then it is obvious that we are dealing with a complex of integrated techniques—not merely with individual gadgets. To illustrate what this means for defensive purposes: the $0.66^{5\times1}$ man overseas may be investigated. If so, he will be put under surveillance.

and the planting of CI people in the household of our man. It is our contention in THS that all 660 people soing overseas—and probably all in Washington assignments—should be sufficiently familiar with what we call the "pitfalls of security" to protect themselves—and 650—from these techniques. We also believe that this defensive training should be given by men who understand the way in which these techniques are integrated and not by men who are experts on this or that gadget. In other words,

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knowledge of the hazards of our trade is as much a part of intelligence training as positive—or offensive—techniques.

- 6. If we apply this same principle of integrated techniques to the next level—those who need all-round familiarity for limits or operational purposes, it is plain that such instruction should be handled by man who know the intelligence game and who also understand the complexity of counter—intelligence or investigative techniques. We believe that a proper training program for intelligence office a going oversear and for Division 6 dofs and Case Offic rs in Mashington should include thorough knowledge of the officialve capabilities of CI techniques, including the necessary tools or padgets. Therefore we have been attempting increasingly to present lectures and devise problems to bring out these techniques—including becaused surveillance.
- 7. A further level of knowledge of techniques properly falls within the province of SES and the technical divisions of OSO. If a particular instrument is to be used for a particular operation, obviously the technician who developed the item should instruct in its workings and maintenance. Or, if high security is involved—as in certain secret writing methods—then again the instruction should be by the expert who knows the neithed.
- present developing training program need be made; however, we should attempt to settle certain points where duplication seems to exist. There are certain types of instruction about which there is no question. This for example, does not touch instruction in codes, ciphers, or both. For each training, The simply acts as the middle-man between the Porei, and characters.

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
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and Commindations. Similarly, we do not-except with express permission of
instruct in SW or in Document intelligence. It should also \$6X1
noted that and a representative of Communications deliver
lectures in our Advanced Intelligence Course to explain their functions
and possible support to operations. However, no do appear to be duplicating

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or briefing has been completed by CCD or CDD, an evaluation of his proficiency will be forwarded through TRS, Sindlarly; TRS will inform CCD or CDD of the level of proficiency achieved by any student turned over to GGB or CDD for advanced training or briefing in items of special equipment.

10. I believe that adoption of the above proposals will eliminate	
present dupli ation of effort in the counter-intelligence training	
program. However, because it has not yet been discussed, I should	
like to mention the fact that This has been giving instruction in	
self-defense - including weapons - and in	25X1
do not fall precisely within the technical field, yet I would like	
some assurance that they belong unier TRS. (As a matter of fact,	
This appears to have the only instructors who have a working knowledge	
of self-defense, weapons, and	25X1

Il. Since we are currently attempting to revise the organization of TRS, as well as to plan future courses, I should like to have clarification on the functions of TRS in the "Technical" field as soon as possible. In order to achieve this, I suggest that this paper be routed to OPSO, DOPC, SES, CDD, and CCD. Then, I believe we should all get together and reach an agreement satisfactory to all of us.

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